

25 October 1978

STAT MEMORANDUM FOR: [REDACTED]
NIO/Special Studies

STAT FROM : [REDACTED]
Director, CIA Operations Center

SUBJECT : DCI's Annual Report

REFERENCE : Your note, same subject, dated 24 October 1978

1. The only topic included in the memorandum from [REDACTED] to Mr. Bowie which we feel requires comment is the Item entitled "Substantive support to African crises" in Paragraph 3e. It seems to me that the qualification of African crisis reflects this DCI's limited experience with crisis situations, i.e., Shaba I and II and not much more. The fact that he has not experienced a serious crisis--Yom Kippur, Pueblo, Czech invasion or even the Mayaguez worries me in the sense that I think he underestimates what a real crisis can do to the normal tranquility of intelligence reporting and production. Therefore, I think this item should be restated under a broader heading called "Crisis support" and include not only substantive but all other aspects of crisis support which NFAC would have to provide in such times. I speak not only of the NIOs' role and the individual production offices but contributions that RES and the Operations Center traditionally have made in these times.

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2. I find it difficult to suggest precise language in this regard but since you have had significant experience during your OCI incarnation, I think you understand what we are trying to say. Unfortunately, this writer has tried to articulate this problem on previous occasions with the new leadership but came away with the feeling that I was not successful in persuading them it deserved serious attention at that level.

*all
in Part II*

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25 October 1978

25X1 NOTE FOR: [REDACTED]

25X1 SUBJECT : DCI Annual Report - Quality of Analysis
[REDACTED]

1. As requested by Allan Goodman, I am listing below my contributions to the effort to improve the quality of analysis:

25X1 a. prior to [REDACTED] held inter-office and inter-agency meeting to discuss alternative outcomes and implications;

b. convened various inter-office meetings of analysts to discuss papers or prepare for European Working Group meetings;

c. on major NFAC papers, have made great effort to conceptualize the approach and develop key questions (see Tab A and Tab B for examples);

d. reviewed individual office drafts of papers and sought additional contributions from other offices to round out the analysis;

e. in reviewing ORPA production programs and managing the NITCs for the Advanced Countries, have tried to highlight priorities and encourage an inter-disciplinary approach;

f. have sought at various times to enlist the support of the DDO and stations abroad in providing project-oriented information and judgmental comment;

g. at the request of D/NFAC, prepared a critique and analysis of the estimative product.

2. I would also consider the following an indirect contribution to upgrading analysis:

a. a more organized and inter-office approach to the briefing of outgoing ambassadors to acquaint them with our products and our information interests and needs (see Tab C);

b. a very substantial attempt to improve the FOCUS assessment of mission reporting on which analysis must rely

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Drafted by [redacted] *for* [redacted] *in response to the attached.*

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20 October 1978

Input to NFAC Contribution for DCI's Annual Report

Part II

Quality of Analysis and Policy Support

NFAC's Long-Range Development Program

1. The Director, NFAC, on 1 May 1978, assigned two experienced intelligence officers to examine and make recommendations about what kind and quality of capability NFAC should develop over the next several years. This two-man team has accomplished an inventory of the professional persons and skills now present in NFAC. The resulting base of knowledge has been recorded in and is being analyzed through a computer program file. It is, for example, providing specific data of value to D/NFAC concerning the distribution of professional manpower resources by functions and geographic assignments. This and much more data being collected by the team is being used to seek out and assess changes which might strengthen the NFAC capability. By December 1978, the team plans to present to D/NFAC a set of recommendations concerning the recruitment and career development of professional analysts, researchers and managers—qualifications and standards required of them, incentives offered to them, and programs of training, educational experience and learning assignments provided to them. At the same time, the team is beginning to examine leadership and organizational

aspects of NFAC, providing some interim advice and suggestions to D/NFAC to be followed by studied recommendations early in 1979. Beyond that point the D/NFAC and the team have not yet selected the next phase of their efforts.

2. From data analyzed in this early phase of NFAC's long-range development program, it is apparent that the Center's analytical and research resources and capabilities concerning certain geographic areas and some functions are uncomfortably thin. D/NFAC, with the relevant managers and the development team, is assessing these areas and functions and what may be required in the way of strengthening.

3. Also in this early phase, more evidence has been developed confirming information that short-deadline intelligence production and responses dominate the use of analytical resources in some key areas of NFAC to the disadvantage of needed and studied analytical work and supporting research. D/NFAC is giving attention to developing an appropriate balance of efforts in this area of concern.